Reclaiming the Label ‘Autistic’

On 4 May, 2026 By BIAP Research ManagerIn Autism, Derogation, Diversity, Neurodiversity, Philosophy of Language, Slurs

This is a post by Bianca Cepollaro (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University), Marta Jorba (Pompeu Fabra University), Valentina Petrolini (University of Bologna).

The word ‘autistic’ has recently been reclaimed, especially within neurodiversity movements. We can observe how it is used with pride in political slogans (e.g., “I am autistic and I am proud”), online communities (e.g., r/AutisticPride on Reddit, whose description reads: “a bunch of proud autistic folks”; #autisticpride hashtag on X), blog posts (e.g., “Autistic as a reclaimed word”), popular articles, and activism.

Derogation, Common Ground, and Why We Disagree

On 16 April, 202616 April, 2026 By BIAP Research ManagerIn Derogation, Philosophy of Language, Slurs, Stereotypes

This is a post by Teresa Marques (University of Barcelona).

Consider how ordinary speakers argue about words like charnego, gitano, or negrito. In some contexts their use is taken to be straightforwardly degrading; in others it is defended as neutral, affectionate, or at least nonderogatory. These disagreements are familiar and often heated. They pose a natural philosophical question: what, exactly, makes a term derogatory, and how should we understand cases in which competent speakers sincerely disagree about whether a word counts as a slur at all?

Assessing the Linguistic Data on Hedged Assertions

On 26 January, 202626 January, 2026 By BIAP Research ManagerIn Assertion, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

This is a post by Dario Mortini (University of Barcelona).

Simple ‘outright’ assertions serve a wide range of familiar communicative purposes in our daily lives: from giving directions (‘The Sagrada Familia is up that street to the right’) to sharing novel and interesting facts about the world (‘The new bakery in the neighbourhood sells apple cake’). However, we are not always well-positioned to make outright assertions. When uncertainty looms, we must settle for something weaker.

Tort and the Demands of Interpersonal Justice: A Reply to Professor Papayannis

On 17 December, 2025 By BIAP Research ManagerIn Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law, Jurisprudence, Moral Philosophy

This is a post by Gregory C. Keating (USC Gould School of Law).

In his excellent blog post Does Tort Law Really Care About You?, Diego Papayannis addresses a fundamental question of tort law and challenges my view of the matter as he understands it from my book Reasonableness and Risk (OUP 2022). The role of the law of torts is to secure us against harm at each other’s hands as we go about our lives in civil society. How then should the law of torts respond to unavoidable harm?

Ignorance Isn’t a Failure

On 12 November, 202516 December, 2025 By BIAP Research ManagerIn Epistemology, Normativity

This is a post by Oscar Piedrahita (University of Barcelona).

You’re mowing your lawn when your neighbor strolls over and asks, “Do you know how many blades of grass you’ve just cut?” You’d naturally answer no. But if they then say “So you’re ignorant of that fact?”, this second question would feel stilted, perhaps even misplaced. Is this something you’re supposed to know? Of course you don’t know the count, but calling you ignorant of that trivial detail sounds like an unwarranted criticism.

Does Tort Law Really Care About You?

On 6 November, 202516 December, 2025 By BIAP Research ManagerIn Jurisprudence, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Law, Political Philosophy

This is a post by Diego M. Papayannis (University of Girona).

Imagine you live just 50 meters away from a massive cement plant. The plant operates lawfully and takes every reasonable precaution, yet its dust emissions still cause severe damage to your property and health. Because the economic activity carried out by the plant is of utmost importance to your town, the court refuses to issue an injunction to put an end to the nuisance. Instead, it awards you permanent damages to compensate for all the harm suffered. Problem solved?

Can Genes Cause Because We Know They Cause?

On 9 September, 20254 May, 2026 By BIAP Research ManagerIn Contextualism, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science

This is a post by Riin Kõiv (University of Barcelona).

Imagine being told that personality, performance in math, substance addiction, or excess body weight has genetic causes. For many, this information plants a sense of inevitability — as if their personality, their math performance, or their body weight were in some sense “determined,” beyond their own control.

I Know How to Withstand the Skeptic

On 14 May, 202516 December, 2025 By BIAP Research ManagerIn Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This is a post by Andrés Soria-Ruiz (University of Barcelona).

Think of the following: for all you know, you could be living in a computer simulation. Your friends might be so-called “Non-Player Characters”; your home, your surroundings might all be part of a sophisticated illusion. All of that is possible, and more worryingly, you—we—have no way of telling whether that’s actually the case.